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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjam in W eintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

WHEN BEING DELINQUENT IS
ORDINARY: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
EXPANDS THE “ ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS
EXCEPTION” UNDER SECTION
547(c)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE

The preference provision of the
Bankruptcy Code is designed to
avoid payments or other transfers
that unfairly benefit some creditors
at the expense of others on the eve
of bankruptcy. This provision,
found in Section 547 of the Code,'
is consistent with a basic policy that
underlies the Code—equality of
treatment among creditors who are
similarly situated.
An important exception to the
trustee’s power to avoid a preferen
tial payment made before bankrupt
cy is the so-called “ ordinary course
of business exception.” ^ This ex
ception was put in the Code so that
normal prebankruptcy business re* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra Uni
versity School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Schriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
' 11U .S.C.§ 547.
^ See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).

lations and transactions are not dis
turbed by the application of Section
547(b). Specifically, a transfer in
payment of an ántecedent debt is not
a voidable preference to the extent
that it meets the following three
requirements. First, the debt must
have been incurred in the ordinary
course of business or financial af
fairs of the debtor and the creditor.
Second, the payment must have
been made in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the creditor. The third
requirement is that the payment
must have been made according to
ordinary business terms.
Statutory amendments and judi
cial developments during the past
decade have greatly expanded the
ordinary course of business excep
tion. Prior to the 1984 amendments
to the Code, the ordinary course of
business exception applied only to
payments made within forty-five
days after the debt was incurred. In
1991, the Supreme Court in Union
Bank V. Wola^ held that the excep
tion is now applicable to long-term
debts as well as to short-term obliga
tions. Most recently, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in In
re U.S.A. Inns o f Eureka Springs,
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Arkansas expanded the scope of the
ordinary course of business excep
tion even further when it held
that the requirement of Section
547(c)(2) that the payments be made
according to “ ordinary business
terms” may be satisfied where the
debtor made late payments in con
formity with the industry-wide
practice in dealing with delinquent
borrowers—rather than limiting the
exception to payments made in con
formity with the usual practice for
financially healthy debtors.
The Facts
U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs,
Arkansas assumed liability under a
$2.7 million collateralized promis
sory note payable to United Savings
and Loan Association. The note re
quired the payment of equal month
ly installments in the sum of
$27,940. When U.S.A. Inns filed a
bankruptcy petition. United’s claim
against it amounted to approximate
ly $2.8 million and was secured
by collateral worth $2.6 million.
Within the ninety-day period prior
to bankruptcy, U.S.A. Inns made
several payments that were irregu
lar as to both time and amount—
none of the payments during that
period equalled the full amount of
the monthly installment that was
due. When the bankruptcy trustee
commenced an action against Unit
ed to recover these payments, the
parties stipulated that all the ele
ments of a voidable preference list
ed in Section 547(b) had been met.
‘ 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).

However, the parties contested
whether the ordinary course of busi
ness exception under Section
547(c)(2) was available as a de
fense.
The bankruptcy court found that
the creditor met its burden to prove
the first two prongs of Section
547(c)(2).* That is, that the debt
was incurred and the payments were
made by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business. However, the
bankruptcy court held that, with re
spect to the third prong of the excep
tion, United failed to produce any
evidence on the issue of wheàier the
payments had been made according
to ‘‘ordinary business terms. ’ The
bankruptcy court reasoned that the
question of whether payments were
made according to ordinary busi
ness terms is one that ‘‘requires an
objective determination whether the
payments are ordinary in relation
to the standards prevailing in the
relevant industry.” ’ The bankrupt
cy court held that United did not
present any evidence that the late
note payments were so common
within the savings and loan industry
that they could be considered an
ordinary .business practice and,
therefore, the exception in Section
547(c)(2) was not a valid defense.
The bankruptcy court then granted
’ In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs,
Ark., 151 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1992). See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(2)(A),
547(c)(2)(B).
‘ 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C).
’ In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs,
Ark., note 5 supra, at 491.
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appeals held that the bankruptcy
court was correct when it held that
a creditor relying on the “ ordinary
course of business exception’’ un
der Section 547(c)(2) must prove
that payments received were made
in accordance with the ordinary
business terms in the industry.
Although the court of appeals
agreed with the standard used by
the bankruptcy court in determining
whether Section 547(c)(2) was ap
plicable, it disagreed witìi the bank
ruptcy court’s application of that
standard in this case and, therefore,,
affirmed the district court’s reversal
of the bankruptcy court’s decision;
It is this part of the court of appeals
decision that greatly expands the
scope of the ordinary course of busi
ness exception.

a $63,000 judgment in favor of the
trustee.
The district court reversed the
bankruptcy court’s decision.® First,
it held that the bankruptcy court
erred when it required objective evi
dence of industry practice for the
purpose of determining whether the
payments were made on ordinary
business terms. The district court
reasoned that, imder binding au
thority in the Eighth Circuit,® the
“ ordinary business terms’’ require
ment found in Section 547(c)(2)(C)
is satisfied “ so long as the late pay
ments were consistent with the
course of dealings between the debt
or and c r e d i t o r . Second, the dis
trict court held that the bankruptcy
court’s finding that United failed to
prove that the payments were made
according to ordinary business
terms was clearly erroneous.

Focusing on Industry Practice for
Delinquent Borrowers

The Relevance of Industry-Wide
Practice

In determining whether United
produced sufficient evidence that
the prepetition payments conformed
to the industry-wide standards so as
to justify a finding that they were
made according to “ ordinary busi
ness terms,’’ the court of appeals
focused on whether the payments
were “ ordinary” for delinquent
borrowers, rather than focusing on
whether they conformed to the usual
practice of healthy borrowers. In
»/d. at 492.
’ The district court was relying on Lovett particular, the court focused on the
V. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494
testimony of one witness—the
(8th Cir. 1991).
chairman, president, and chief ex
Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
" The court cited, e.g.. In re Tolona ecutive officer of United—who tes
Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir.
tified that it was the regular practice
1993); Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp., 957
in thie savings and loan industry to
F.2d239(6thCir. 1992).

The court of appeals disagreed
with the district court’s holding that
the rule in the Eighth Cifcuit was
that evidence'of industry-wide prac
tice is irrelevant in determining
whether payments were made ac
cording to “ ordinary business
terms.’’ Analyzing the law in that
circuit, as well as the prevailing case
law in other circuits," the court of
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work with delinquent customers as
long as some type of payment was
forthcoming. He testified that Unit
ed was encouraged and directed by
regulatory authorities to work with
borrowers in the “ so-called real es
tate crisis that is going on across the
country,” '^ and that the Office of
Thrift Supervision directed United
to work with delinquent borrowers
in a manner that conformed to the
industry-wide standards for dealing
with troubled loans. He also testi
fied that the late payments from
U.S. A. Inns were made in a manner
that “ could be ordinary on those
accounts . . . where there is default,
delinquency and there is a workout
process. . . .’"^Moreover, he testi
fied that “ probably eight to ten per
cent” of United’s accounts were on
a similar pay schedule as U.S.A.
Inns.
Recognizing that “ [w]hat consti
tutes ‘ordinary business terms’ will
vary widely from industry to indus
t r y , t h e court of appeals noted
that it is common practice in the
savings and loan industry to work
with delinquent debtors in a way
that is consistent with United’s
treatment of U.S.A. Inns. There
fore, the manner in which the late
payments in this case were made
was not particularly unusual in that
industry. “ [W]e feel the focus of
subsection (c)(2)(C) should be on
whether the terms between the parIn re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs,
Ark., note 4 supra, at 685.
" Id .
'* Id.

ties were particularly unusual in the
relevant industry, and that evidence
of a prevailing industry practice
among similarly situated members
of the industry facing the same or
similar problems is sufficient to
satisfy
subsection
(c)(2)(C)’s
burden. ” '5
The court also agreed with the
loose standard recently formulated
by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in In re Tolona Piz
za Products Corp.,'^ where the
court held that the phrase “ ordinary
business terms”
in Section
547(c)(2)(C) “ refers to the range of
terms that encompasses the prac
tices in which firms similar in some
general way to the creditor in ques
tion engage, and that only dealings
so idiosyncratic as to fall outside
that broad range should be deemed
extraordinary and therefore outside
the scope of subsection (C).” ”
Applying the standard set forth in
Tolona Pizza, the court of appeals
in U. S./4. Inns found that the testi
mony of United’s chairman, presi
dent, and chief executive officer
“ was sufficient to satisfy United’s
burden of proving industry-wide
practice dealing with real estate
trouble loans” and had established
" Id .

“ 3F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1033. Although the court of
appeals in Tolona Pizza adopted a loose
standard for determining whether payments
conformed to ordinary business terms in
the industry, the dissenting judge, while
agreeing with that standard, could not con
clude that the creditor in fact made the requi
site showing for Section 547(c)(2)(C) to
apply.
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that United “ was following the pre
vailing practice among similarlysituated savings and loans with de
linquent customers to satisfy sub
section (c)(2)(C)’s burden. The
terms on which United dealt with
U.S.A. Inns were not so ‘idiosyn
cratic’ or ‘extraordinary’ as to fall
outside the broad scope of subsec
tion (c)(2)(C).’’'®United “ has car
ried its burden of proof of demon
strating conformity with industry
practice in dealing with late loan
payments, and it has satisfied the
objective requirement of subsection
(c)(2)(C) by showing that such late
loan payments are common within
the savings and loan industry and
that it is considered ordinary busi
ness practice.’”’ Therefore, the
bankruptcy court erred in awarding
the money judgment against United.
Conclusion
We agree that Section 547(c)(2)(C) requires the court to con
sider industry-wide practices when
determining whether prepetition
payments were made “ according to
ordinary business terms.’’ Howev
er, construing the phrase “ ordinary
business terms’’ in Section
547(c)(2)(C) to include usual indus
try practices dealing with delinquent
borrowers, rather than healthy cus
tomers, could severely limit a trust
ee’s ability to recover otherwise
voidable preferences. Late and ir
regular payments by debtors could

[VOL. 27 : 208 1994]

be found to be “ ordinary” so long
as other delinquent debtors in that
industry usually act in a sunilar
manner.
It is too early to predict whether
U. S.A. Inns will be followed in most
other circuits or whether it will be
broadly construed even within the
Eighth Circuit. Perhaps it will be
applied only in troubled industries,
such as the savings and loan industry
plagued by delinquent real estate
mortgage loans.
It is not surprising to these au
thors, however, that only two
months after the decision in U.S.A.
Inns, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in In re Meridith Hoff
man Partner^ expressly rejected
the construction of the phrase “ or
dinary business terms” used in
U.S.A. Inns in a case where the
debtor made prepetition payments
under an escrow arrangement estab
lished after the debtor defaulted on
a real estate mortgage loan. The
court in Meridith Hoffman held that
ordinary business terms are “ the
kinds of terms that creditors and
debtors use in ordinary circum
stances, where debtors are
healthy. . . . This construction is
consistent with the purpose of the
ordinary course of business excep
tion, which is “ to leave undisturbed
normal financing relations, because
it does not detract from the general
policy of the preference section to
discourage unusual action by either
the debtor or his creditors during the

'* In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs,
Ark., note 4 supra, at 685-686.
'’ /d. at 686.
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“ 12F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1553.
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debtor’s slide into bankruptcy.
The court in Meridith Hoffinan stat
ed that “ [e]ven arrangements that
creditors commonly try to use when
a debtor is struggling may give a
creditor an advantage over others
and precipitate bankruptcy. For ex“ Id., quoting from S. Rep. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2 d Sess. 88 (1978).
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ample, filing a lawsuit to enforce a
debt may not be unusual when a
debtor does not pay, but payments
according to a settlement agreement
are not according to ordinary busi
ness terms.

“ In re Meridith Hoffman Partners, note
20 supra, at 1553.
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